SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CRIMINAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-STATE MAY OFFER EVIDENCE OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS AT RESENTENCING HEARING

DESPITE JURY'S NON-UNANIMOUS DECISION AS TO THEIR
EXISTENCE IN FIRST PROCEEDING--Statev. Koedatich, 118 NJ.

513, 572 A.2d 622 (1990).
In October 1984, a Morris County jury found James Jerold
Koedatich guilty of the abduction, sexual assault, and murder of
eighteen-year old Amie Hoffman and sentenced him to death.
118 NJ. at 515, 572 A.2d at 623. During the penalty phase of the
trial, the state charged four aggravating factors; a previous murder conviction (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(a) (West 1990)),
murder committed while engaged in the commission of or flight
from the commission of a sexual assault and kidnapping (N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(g) (West 1990)), murder committed for
the purpose of escaping detection (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 13c(4)(f) (West 1990)), and an outrageously and wantonly vile
murder (NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(c) (West 1990)). 118 N.J.
at 516, 572 A.2d at 623. Although the jury unanimously found
that the first two aggravating factors existed, one of the twelve
jurors did not find the murder "outrageously wanton and vile",
and six jurors did not conclude that the murder was committed
to "escape detection." Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence due to reversible error by
the trial court in the penalty phase. Id. More specifically, the
supreme court found that the trial court erroneously charged the
jury that imposition of a penalty other than death would only be
appropriate if the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating
factors. Id. Additionally, the supreme court determined that the
trial court erred in requiring the jury's unanimous decision of a
determination of the existence of mitigating factors. Id. As a result, the court remanded the case for a new penalty phase hearing. Id.
The state subsequently filed a notice of intention to seek the
death penalty at resentencing, using the same four aggravating
factors charged in the prior proceeding. Id. The defendant, relying on the supreme court's recent decisions in State v. Biegenwald
(Biegenwald II), 106 NJ. 13, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) and State v.
Biegenwald (Biegenwald III), 110 N.J. 521, 542 A.2d 442 (1988),
argued that the state may not resubmit the aggravating factors
that were not unanimously found to exist at the sentencing
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phase. 118 N.J. at 517, 572 A.2d at 623. The trial court found
the defendant's argument persuasive and held that the state was
barred from using the "outrageously wanton and vile" murder
and murder to "escape detection" factors. Id., 572 A.2d at 62324. The state appealed and the supreme court granted certification. Id. at 515, 572 A.2d at 623.
The Koedatich court began its analysis by noting that the Capital Punishment Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (West 1990), offered no guidelines from which to glean information, and that
prior case law was of no assistance. Id. More specifically, the
court pointed out that Biegenwald II, which barred the state from
proving aggravating factors at resentencing due to scant evidence in the record as to their existence, and Biegenwald III,
which allowed the introduction of a subsequent murder conviction at resentencing, were not dispositive of the issue at bar. Id.
at 517-18, 572 A.2d at 624.
Recognizing the coextensiveness of double jeopardy protection at both the state and federal level, Justice Stein, writing for
the court, proceeded with an overview of the United States
Supreme Court's position on sentencing issues. Id. at 518, 572
A.2d at 624 (citations omitted). The NewJersey Supreme Court
first addressed the seminal case of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 (1965), in which the United States Supreme Court designated three purposes of double jeopardy: protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and protection against multiple punishments for the
same offense. 118 N.J. at 519, 572 A.2d at 625. The New Jersey
Supreme Court explained that the Pearce holding set forth a
"clean slate" doctrine, which is premised on the theory that after
conviction on retrial, imposition of a harsher sentence may be
authorized because "the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean." Id.
at 519-20, 572 A.2d at 625 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721).
The New Jersey Supreme Court next pointed to established
case law that distinguished between acquittals and the pronouncement of a sentence-the latter being devoid of the same
degree of finality. Id. at 520, 572 A.2d at 625. However, the
court explained that such distinctions are modified in the special
circumstances of penalty phase proceedings in capital cases, and
as a result a salient exception to the "clean slate" doctrine exists.
Id. The court recognized Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430
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(1981), as articulating the exception that precludes a state from
imposing the death penalty once a decree of life imprisonment is
handed down at the initial trial. 118 N.J. at 520-21, 572 A.2d at
625-26.
In further narrowing general case law to address the issue at
hand, the court discussed the effect of Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S.
147 (1986), in which the "acquittal" analogy was "applied to the
resubmission at resentencing of an aggravating factor rejected at
the original trial." 118 N.J. at 521, 572 A.2d at 626. The court
noted that the Poland Court determined that although the aggravating factor was not found to exist on initial sentencing, the defendant was not necessarily "acquitted," and so, if the evidence
was legally sufficient, the aggravating factor could be used for
consideration by the reviewing court. Id. at 522, 572 A.2d at 627.
The court found a great deal of merit in the Poland decision and
pointed to its sound reasoning in refusing to "view the capital
sentencing hearing as a set of mini-trials on the existence of each
aggravating circumstance." Id. (quoting Poland, 476 U.S at 155).
Consequently, the court recognized the federal double jeopardy
doctrine as holding that the "clean slate" rationale of Pearce will
apply to a new sentencing proceeding when the facts divulge that
the defendant had previously been sentenced to death, successfully appealed, and the record indicates that there is sufficient
evidence to mandate the original death penalty. Id. at 523, 572
A.2d at 627.
In concluding that a non-unanimous decision does not constitute an "acquittal" of an aggravating factor, the court went on
to reconcile its decision with the Capital Punishment Act. Id. at
524, 572 A.2d at 628. The court stated the correct procedure:
In the sentencing phase, the jury is obliged to determine, first,
the existence of any aggravating factor or factors. The jury
must find that at least one aggravating factor exists before the
death penalty may be imposed. If the jury "finds that no aggravating factors exist ... the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b," which requires a term of
imprisonment. If, however, the jury finds an aggravating factor exists, then it must determine whether any mitigating factors also exist. After making fact findings about "the existence
or nonexistence" of aggravating and mitigating factors, the
jury must then make the normative judgment whether the aggravating outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Id. at 524-25, 572 A.2d at 628 (quoting State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J.
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123, 158, 548 A.2d 887, 904 (1988)). In recognizing that the Capital Punishment Act mandates a bifurcated trial in which the punishment is decided in a separate proceeding, the court pointed out its
interpretation of the Act as requiring a unanimous decision for the
existence of aggravating factors. Id. at 525, 572 A.2d at 628. Additionally, the court reasoned that it is plausible that the jury may not
"exhaust its deliberative capacity in an effort to achieve unanimity"
if it has already determined that an aggravating factor exists which
outweighs any mitigating factor. Id. at 525-26, 572 A.2d at 628. In
holding that a non-unanimous decision of an aggravating factor is
only a relevant finding in that particular penalty phase proceeding,
the court distinguished the reliability attending a verdict of acquittal
from the decision of whether or not a certain element of the case
was an aggravating factor. Id. at 526, 572 A.2d at 629.
The court next addressed the assertion that aggravating factors
are analogous to elements of a crime, and therefore, a retrial of the
same aggravating factors would constitute a retrial of the same
crime. Id. The court pointed out that when multiple aggravating
factors are submitted to the jury it is not necessary that all of the
factors be found to exist for a death sentence. Id. Thus, the court
posited, the "elements of the crime" analogy is not applicable to
aggravating factors in a sentencing hearing. Id. at 526-27, 572 A.2d
at 629. The court, while conceding that the Capital Punishment Act
authorizes non-unanimous verdicts in the sentencing phase, stated
that no such authorization exists in determining whether a nonunanimous vote on aggravating factors violates double jeopardy
principles. Id. at 527, 572 A.2d at 629.
After identifying the "overwhelming majority" of jurisdictions
that also found little merit in double jeopardy challenges in similar
circumstances, the court went on to address the doctrine of fundamental fairness. Id. at 528, 572 A.2d at 630. The court initially focused on State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 197 A.2d 678 (1964), in which
the defendant, after striking a police officer with his car, was convicted of atrocious assault over one year after his original reckless
driving offense. 118 N.J. at 528, 572 A.2d at 630. The Currie court
deemed the second prosecution as lacking "elements of oppression
or harassment" and concluded that the primary consideration of
"reasonable expectations in the light of the constitutional and common law goals" had been met. Id. at 529, 572 A.2d at 630 (quoting
Currie, 41 N.J. at 543, 539). The court also relied on State v. Ramseur,
106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (holding juries be informed of
the option to return a non-unanimous verdict), State v. Biegenwald
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(Biegenwald II), 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (employing a reasonable doubt standard for aggravating factors to outweigh mitigating factors), and State v. Biegenwald (Biegenwald I1), 110 N.J. 521, 542
A.2d 442 (1988) (determining the existence of elements of surprise
or unfairness as factors to consider), in concluding that the state did
not violate any policies underlying the notions of fairness which
seek to prevent multiple prosecutions for the same offense. 118 N.J.
at 530, 572 A.2d at 631. As a consequence, the court allowed the
resubmission of the aggravating factors at the second penalty phase
proceeding to allow the jury to receive all the evidence relating to
the defendant's offense. Id. at 532, 572 A.2d at 632.
Justice Handler, in a dissent in which Justice Clifford joined in
respect to the majority's ruling that non-unanimous jury decisions
are unreliable, opined that aggravating factors compose the definition of capital murder, and therefore, constitute essential elements.
Id. (Handler, J., dissenting). Thejustice observed that the court had
previously recognized this proposition in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J.
123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987), and that a subsequent prosecution of an
offense on the identical elements that existed in the earlier prosecution is tantamount to prosecution of the same crime. 118 N.J. at
533-34, 572 A.2d at 632-33 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing State v.
DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 527 A.2d 1355 (1987)).
In asserting the untenability of the majority's position that aggravating factors do not constitute elements of a crime, Justice Handler added that, for double jeopardy purposes, trials for guilt can
not be distinguished from trials on sentencing. Id. at 535, 572 A.2d
at 633 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler noted that the majority was misguided in relying on the "inapposite statutory
scheme" of Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986), and by doing so,
redefined the significance of statutory aggravating factors. 118 N.J.
at 535-36, 572 A.2d 633-34 (Handler, J., dissenting). The justice
claimed that the majority erroneously decided that aggravating factors are "incidental facts" rather than critical components of the
trial. Id. Justice Handler pointed to the avoidance tactics used by
the court to rationalize that the jury's determination of these factors
is not a "significant decision" worthy of double jeopardy protection.
Id. Justice Handler further revealed the court's flawed characterization of aggravating factors as "mini-trials." Id. at 536-37, 572 A.2d
at 634 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that such a
labeling is not only confusing, but inaccurate, as the separate deliberation for each aggravating factor is functionally identical to the
deliberation of each element of a crime. Id. Consequently, the jus-
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tice added, the majority's mischaracterization of the aggravating factors only blurred an analysis of the relevant issue; the equal
significance that should be accorded a statutory aggravating factor
and an essential element of a crime. Id. at 537, 572 A.2d at 634
(Handler, J., dissenting).
Justice Handler next addressed "non-unanimity" in capital
murder sentencing and stated that the majority's position that aggravating factors do not constitute a verdict, was "unfathomable".
Id. at 538, 572 A.2d at 635 (Handler, J., dissenting). In citing case
law such as State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987), in
which the court recognized a non-unanimous decision as a jury verdict, Justice Handler could not reconcile the court's reasoning that
depicted a non-unanimous determination as a non-determination.
118 N.J. at 539, 572 A.2d at 635 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice
Handler opined that it is within the legislature's intent that a failure
to reach a unanimous conclusion as to the existence of an aggravating factor would legally equate with that factor's rejection. Id.
Justice Handler further stated that the court's contrary view
stemmed from its inaccurate portrayal ofjurors as being unreliable
when they have failed to reach unanimous decisions. Id. at 540, 572
A.2d at 636 (Handler, J., dissenting). In reasoning that jury instructions explaining sentencing procedure dictate that the jury determine aggravating factors before considering mitigating factors,
Justice Handler concluded that any assertions that the jury might
not "exhaust its deliberative capacity" is illogical, barring assumptions of willful refusal to follow instructions. Id.
Justice Handler portrayed the exacerbating confusion attendant
to the court's holding as the result of a failure to pinpoint whether
non-unanimity, or the statutory aggravating factor, was the basis for
the jury finding not being considered an "acquittal" and within the
confines of the fifth amendment double jeopardy protection. Id. at
541, 572 A.2d at 636 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler
stated that the court's holding can only have two meanings. Id., 572
A.2d at 636-37 (Handler, J., dissenting). First, if non-unanimity is
the infirmity, then a unanimous rejection of an aggravating factor
would constitute an acquittal, and bar representation. Id. Second, if
the aggravating factor is the problem, however, then the court has
effectively repudiated the capital murder statute and case law's subsequent interpretations. Id.
In reaching the conclusion that the jury legally rejected two essential elements of a crime after having been instructed that a nonunanimous decision precluded a reconsideration of that factor, Jus-
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tice Handler vehemently disagreed with the court's finding that
resubmission of the aggravating factors is appropriate. Id. at 54142, 572 A.2d 637 (Handler,J., dissenting). Justice Handler rebuffed
the court for abandoning the underlying principles of double jeopardy-fairness and freedom from harassment and oppression-and
flatly holding against the court's prior applications of the Capital
Punishment Act without explicitly overruling past decisions. Id. at
543, 572 A.2d at 637-38 (Handler,J., dissenting). The court's decision, according to Justice Handler, will allow the execution of defendants without providing them their right to the fullest measure of
protection. Id., 572 A.2d at 638.
Justice O'Hern also filed a dissent in which both Justice Clifford
and Justice Handler concurred. Id. (O'Hern, J., dissenting). In initially addressing the policy concerns that arise in a drawn out case of
this nature, Justice O'Hern expressed the sagacity of the trial court's
decision not to raise constitutional issues and instead to let the decision stand. Id. at 543-44, 572 A.2d at 638 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Hern then stated that the majority was operating under an
incorrect understanding of jury procedure in capital cases. Id. at
544, 572 A.2d at 638 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). In relying on the
court's previous explanation in State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J. 123, 548
A.2d 887 (1988), that aggravating factors must be determined
before mitigating factors and then the two factors must be weighed,
Justice O'Hern acknowledged the "solemn significance" accorded
the jury verdict. 118 N.J. at 544, 572 A.2d at 638 (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting).
Justice O'Hern, drew an analogy between aggravating factors
and lesser felonies such as rape and robbery, and concluded that if a
defendant was convicted of a non-capital murder but acquitted of
the underlying crime, the state could never retry the rape or robbery
because it felt that the jury had not exhausted its deliberative capacity. Id. at 545, 572 A.2d at 638-39 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). In holding a non-unanimous decision "a verdict in every sense of the
word," Justice O'Hern reasoned that the ultimate goal of death penalty jurisprudence, reliability in the appropriate punishment, is lost.
Id. at 545-46, 572 A.2d at 639 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The reality
becomes more acute, posited Justice O'Hern, in realizing that one
defendant may receive the benefits of a non-unanimous verdict and
live, while another may die depending on the existence of additional
aggravating factors. Id. at 546, 572 A.2d at 639 (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting).
Justice O'Hern surmised that the majority used its intuition,
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rather than a consistent application of the law, in allowing the retrial
of the "outrageously wanton and vile" factor because of the lopsided eleven to one jury vote. Id. In dispelling the majority's "clean
slate" theories, Justice O'Hern pointed out that the defendant in a
non-capital case always retains the benefit of a favorable jury verdict, and thus refusal to apply these principles is inexplicable. Id. at
546-47, 572 A.2d at 639 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (citing Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
Justice O'Hern emphatically distinguished Polandv. Arizona, 476
U.S. 147 (1986), from the case at bar. 118 N.J. at 547, 572 A.2d at
640 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). In emphasizing that Poland is unclear
as an example of a jury's factual rejection of an aggravating factor,
Justice O'Hern further observed that Arizona's sentencing scheme,
in which capital sentencing is within the judge's purview, is inapposite to New Jersey's in which jurors determine the outcome. Id. at
547-48, 572 A.2d at 640 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern
concluded his dissent by cautioning the court that the consequences
of a wrong decision will be borne by all when final disposition may
again be postponed after yet another retrial. Id. at 548, 572 A.2d at
640 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
In Koedatich, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the controversial issue of the death penalty and the role aggravating factors
play in the sentencing process. Although the lengthy opinion addresses several side issues, the crux of the argument can be focused
on the appropriate weight and importance an aggravating factor
should be accorded. The majority falters by refusing to attach any
reliability to non-unanimous decisions and, in so holding, usurps
the jury of its critical decision-making role and the defendant of his
constitutional rights.
As both dissenting opinions correctly acknowledged, the majority operates from the incorrect assumption that a jury might not
"exhaust its deliberative capacity" if it determines one aggravating
factor will outweigh any mitigating factor. Such a bold statement,
that can only be construed as conjecture, is not a solid foundation
on which to base a decision, especially when an individual's life
hangs in the balance. Consequently, the court's unwillingness to
deem aggravating factors as an "essential element of a crime" is
misguided under the present circumstances.
Despite the problems associated with this decision, it nevertheless remains the law of New Jersey. In a state that has yet to take a
human being's life for the commission of a murder, the Koedatich
court comes to a surprising decision that refuses to extend double
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jeopardy protections to a non-unanimous verdict on the existence of
aggravating factors. This holding raises many questions concerning
the direction in which NewJersey's death penalty law is headed, and
foreshadows a possible shift from the liberal attitudes espoused by
the court in recent years.
Gregory G. Tole
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DEFENSE IS INAPPLICABLE TO DRUNK DRIVING CHARGE-State

v. Hammond, 118 N.J. 306, 571 A.2d 942 (1990).
During a dinner party at his home, Theodore Hammond
consumed approximately two glasses of wine and a mixed drink
containing vodka. 118 N.J. at 307, 571 A.2d at 942. Later that
same evening, Hammond visited the home of one of his dinner
guests and consumed what he believed to be fruit juice. Unbeknownst to Hammond, however, the fruit juice had been mixed
with vodka. Hammond drank three glasses of the vodka/juice
mixture, ingesting ten to twelve ounces of vodka. Id. at 308, 571
A.2d at 942. While driving home, Hammond was stopped by a
Hopewell Township police officer because the officer observed
Hammond's car swerving from one lane to another. The police
officer noted in his report that Hammond was unable to walk
properly, smelled of alcohol, and slurred his speech. Additionally, results of a breathalyzer test which was administered to
Hammond indicated that Hammond's blood alcohol concentration was twice the legal limit. Hammond was charged with violating the Motor Vehicle Act, which prohibits the operation of a
motor vehicle "while under the influence of liquor ....
or ...
with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more." Id. at
307, 571 A.2d at 942 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West
1989)).
At a municipal court hearing, the judge found Hammond
guilty of operating an automobile while intoxicated. Id. at 309,
571 A.2d at 943. The municipal court declared that involuntary
intoxication is a defense to a violation under the Motor Vehicle
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Act and would have been applied had the court determined that
Hammond had become intoxicatedby consuming liquor without
knowledge. Id. Hammond appealed his conviction to the New
Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, raising the defense of involuntary intoxication. Id. The law division affirmed Hammond's
conviction, stating that the record showed beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hammond had driven while under the influence of
alcohol. Id. Additionally, the court refused to "endorse or accept the Municipal Court's statement.

. .

that involuntary intoxi-

cation is a defense to the drunk driving statute." Id.
The appellate division reversed and remanded the case for
retrial, determining that involuntary intoxication may serve as an
affirmative defense to a violation under the drunk driving statute.
Id. The appellate court reasoned that a drunk driving violation
under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 constitutes an offense within the
meaning of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code). 118
N.J at 310, 571 A.2d at 943. Therefore, the court found that a
drunk driving offense is within the purview of the Code's general
provisions, including the provision that culpability can only be
proven where the defendant acted voluntarily or knowingly. Id.
The court further asserted that the drunk driving statute does
not indicate that the legislature intended to impose strict liability
on a drunk driver solely by proof of motor vehicle operation, and

"thus, as a matter of elemental fairness, a voluntary act is minimally required to prove culpability." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Consequently, the court concluded that a
defendant charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated
could assert the Code's involuntary intoxication defense set forth
in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8 (West 1989) by showing absence of
the voluntary or knowing consumption of alcohol. 118 NJ. at
314, 571 A.2d at 943. The NewJersey Supreme Court granted
the state's petition for certification and reversed the appellate division in a unanimous opinion. Id. at 319, 571 A.2d at 949.
Justice Handler, writing for the court, began his analysis by
rejecting the appellate division's assertion that a motor vehicle
violation constitutes a "petty offense" within the meaning of the
Code and thus invokes the Code's provision requiring a voluntary act or knowing mental state as a precondition to culpability.
Id. at 310-11, 571 A.2d at 944. The court found that the Code
itself does not use the term "petty offense", but instead states
that an offense is a "crime, a disorderly persons offense or a petty
disorderly persons offense." Id. at 311, 571 A.2d at 944 (quoting
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The court further

noted that the legislative history of the Code indicates a legislative intent that the Code not apply to motor vehicle violations.
Id. at 312, 571 A.2d at 944. Justice Handler observed that the
legislative purpose underlying the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Act supported the court's conclusion that the Code provisions
are inapplicable to motor vehicle violations. Id.
The court asserted that the application of the involuntary intoxication defense to drunk driving violations does not make
"good sense." Id. at 313, 571 A.2d at 945. Although the court
recognized that the Code defense would apply if it negated an
element of an offense, Justice Handler stated that the drunk driving statute does not itself require, as a material element of a driving while intoxicated violation, a voluntary act with respect to the
consumption of alcohol. Id. at 313-14, 571 A.2d at 945. The
supreme court held that NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West 1989)
could not be construed as to require "voluntary intoxication."
118 N.J. at 314, 571 A.2d at 945. Moreover, the court stressed
that nowhere does the Code suggest that the voluntary standard
be applied to motor vehicle violations. Id.
The supreme court also found no basis for the appellate
court's conclusion that the inapplicability of the Code's requirement that the act be voluntary would create an undesirable strict
liability standard for driving while intoxicated. Id., 571 A.2d at
946. Justice Handler asserted that driving while intoxicated has
long been perceived as a strict liability defense which requires no
culpable mental state. Id.
The court emphasized that the motor vehicle provisions for
driving while intoxicated set forth an objective, not subjective,
state of intoxication. Id. at 315, 571 A.2d at 946 (citing State v.
Downie, 117 NJ. 450, 569 A.2d 242 (1990)). Justice Handler
noted that if the involuntary intoxication defense applied to driving while intoxicated violations, it would contradict the legislature's underlying purpose to impose a strict liability standard. Id.
at 315-16, 571 A.2d at 946-47. The court reasoned that a motorist that asserts the involuntary intoxication defense could escape
liability by merely proving that he or she was unable to stop driving or was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of driving while
under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 316, 571 A.2d at 947. This
would result, according to the court, in an undesirable paradoxthe more intoxicated a motorist, the less culpable. Id. Accordingly, the court determined that the involuntary intoxication de-
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fense is "wholly discordant with the liability envisioned by the
statute." Id.
The Hammond decision illustrates the tension between society's need to deter drunk driving and an individual's right to assert a defense to a drunk driving charge. The court correctly
recognized that neither the motor vehicle act nor the criminal
code require, as a prerequisite to liability, the voluntary consumption of alcohol. Thus, the court wisely reasoned that a contrary interpretation requiring the voluntary consumption of an
intoxicating substance as an element of a drunk driving violation
would necessarily lead to a paradoxical result: The more intoxicated a motorist becomes, the better his or her chance of avoiding liability. Therefore, the court's opinion serves to reinforce
the purpose and effect of the drunk driving statute, which provides that these violations are to be measured by an objective
standard of intoxication without regard to a motorist's subjective
state.
PatriciaM. Forsyth
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FENDANT TO REGAIN COMPOSURE PRIOR TO THE SLAYING-

State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 568 A.2d 879 (1990).
On March 16, 1984, the defendant, Manuel Antonio Mauricio, was forcibly removed from a nightclub by a bouncer who had
refused him admission. 117 N.J. at 405-06, 568 A.2d at 880. The
bouncer claimed that Mauricio had had too much to drink, despite evidence that the defendant was able to ascend the flight of
stairs to the nightclub, count his money at the entrance, and
quickly stand up after his altercation with the bouncer. Id., 568
A.2d at 880-81. A witness to this initial confrontation testified
that the bouncer pushed Mauricio to the floor, and Mauricio may
have hit his head. Id. at 406, 568 A.2d at 881.
Approximately twenty minutes later, Mauricio returned to

the nightclub and began knocking on a plastic partition at the
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entrance. Id. at 406-07, 568 A.2d at 881. After requesting that
Mauricio leave, the bouncer swung open the nightclub door,
thereby trapping the defendant against the wall. Id. at 407, 568
A.2d at 881. The bouncer, purportedly angered by Mauricio's
return visit, wrestled the defendant down the stairs, pushed him
out of the main door, and allegedly kicked him. Mauricio nonetheless continued to loiter on the street outside the nightclub. Id.
at 407-08, 568 A.2d at 881.
The victim, Gary Rizzo, a patron uninvolved in the dispute,
left the nightclub five minutes later. Id. at 408, 568 A.2d at 881.
A passing motorist observed the defendant speaking to Rizzo.
The motorist testified that Rizzo was impatiently gesturing for
Mauricio to leave him alone. Id., 568 A.2d at 882. Rizzo began
to walk away from the defendant, who briefly crouched behind a
parked automobile. Mauricio thereafter followed Rizzo into a
parking garage where he shot Rizzo four times with a sawed-off
shotgun, allegedly laughing between shots. Id. at 408-09, 568
A.2d at 882.
At trial, the state argued that Mauricio shot Rizzo in the mistaken belief that he was the nightclub bouncer. Id. The defendant employed this mistaken-identity argument to support a
request for a jury charge on passion/provocation manslaughter.
Id. The trial court denied this request, as well as the requested
instruction on aggravated manslaughter based on intoxication.
Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted of "knowing and
purposeful murder and possession of [a] sawed-off.shotgun." Id.
at 402, 568 A.2d at 879.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed,
holding that the evidence presented at trial did not support ajury
charge on passion/provocation manslaughter. Id. at 409, 568
A.2d at 882. Reviewing the facts in the case, the court concluded
that the defendant's forced removal from the nightclub was insufficient to provoke a reasonable man into an act of such extreme
violence. Id. at 409-10, 568 A.2d at 882. The appellate court
rejected the mistaken-identity theory as probative of a passion
crime, and instead focused on the deliberate and calculated nature of the defendant's behavior prior to the shooting. Id. Noting that the defendant had failed to establish the requisite
"prostration of faculties," the court further determined that he
could not sustain an intoxication defense. Id. at 410, 568 A.2d at
882 (quoting State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 54, 514 A.2d
1302,1308 (1986)). The NewJersey Supreme Court granted de-
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fendant's petition for certification and reversed. Id. at 402, 568
A.2d at 879.
Justice Clifford, writing for a unanimous court, first examined the common law origin of passion/provocation manslaughter. Id. at 410, 568 A.2d at 883. The court found that the
common law applicability of passion/provocation manslaughter
hinged on an objective standard. Id. Justice Clifford explained
that the crime did not recognize slight provocations involving
short-tempered individuals, but rather an objectively adequate
provocation which would induce reasonable passion in an ordinary person. Id. Subjective personality traits were therefore excluded from the threshold analysis of passion/provocation
manslaughter, later codified as NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-4b(2)
(West Supp. 1989). 117 N.J. at 411, 568 A.2d at 883. The court
discerned that this statute evinced a legislative intent to preserve
the objective approach advanced by the common law. Id.
Justice Clifford delineated the elements of passion/provocation manslaughter as adequate provocation, insufficient time to
regain composure, actual provocation, and actual failure to
regain composure prior to the slaying. Id. (citations omitted).
The justice stressed that the element of adequate provocation
was inherently objective, requiring that a defendant's loss of selfcontrol reasonably follow from a severe provocation. Id. at 412,
568 A.2d at 883-84. The court further opined that the objective
period for a defendant to regain self-control was not a fixed
amount of time, but more a function of the overall factual context. Id. at 413, 568 A.2d at 884. The justice recognized that a
trial court should only withhold a passion/provocation charge
when, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could possibly infer
that a defendant was adequately provoked and lacked sufficient
time to regain control. Id. at 412, 568 A.2d at 884.
Evaluating the facts of the case, the supreme court held that
the violent confrontations between Mauricio and the bouncer
were sufficient to create a jury question regarding an adequate
provocation. Id. at 414, 568 A.2d at 885. Justice Clifford emphasized that any significant battery tended to be per se provocative.
Id., 568 A.2d at 884-85. The court contrasted the volatile nature
of Mauricio's removal from the nightclub with his somewhat diminutive size, suggesting that the bouncer employed excessive
force and was the provocateur. Id. at 417, 568 A.2d at 886. The
justice further stated that the short time between Mauricio's ejection from the nightclub and his homicidal act gave rise to a ques-
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tion of fact concerning the period of time for a reasonable person
to regain composure. Id. at 415, 568 A.2d at 885.
The court posited that the remaining elements of passion/
provocation manslaughter involved a subjective inquiry almost
exclusively for thejury. Id. at 413, 568 A.2d at 884. Aside from a
reasonable person being provoked and lacking time to regain
control, the jury must determine whether this particular defendant was provoked and committed the homicidal act before
regaining composure. Id. at 415, 568 A.2d at 885. Justice Clifford held that, assuming, arguendo, that the threshold objective
elements are satisfied, the trial court should generally submit the
subjective elements for jury consideration. Id. The court
stressed that in examining the evidence, the jury was free to draw
inferences contrary to those offered by the defendant. Id. at 417,
568 A.2d at 886. After holding that the failure to grant the passion/provocation manslaughter charge constituted reversible error, the court discounted the defendant's intoxication defense,
characterizing the evidence presented at trial as insufficient and
overly conclusive. Id. at 418-19, 568 A.2d at 887. The justice
determined that any jury finding in favor of intoxication would
thus be purely speculative. Id. at 420, 568 A.2d at 888.
In promulgating the standards for passion/provocation
manslaughter, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mauricio gave
implicit deference to the fact finding role of the jury. Whenever
the evidence might yield different interpretations, it is for the
jury to properly resolve the factual dispute. The jury additionally
serves as an integral buffer between the state and the defendant,
providing impartiality and interposing the conscience of the community into an otherwise formalistic legal proceeding. The jury
is also the conduit through which the law remains current with
the mores of society.
Despite its inherent limitations, the jury represents a societal
cross-section, and ostensibly embodies the aggregate wisdom of
the community. The jury, as opposed to a solitary judge, is
therefore better equipped to glean the truth by evaluating factual
conflict, scrutinizing witness demeanor, and weighing the veracity of witness testimony. The knowledge and experience of the
jury is particularly valuable in the adjudication of passion/provocation manslaughter, where the standards for provocation are intrinsically elusive, and the time to regain self-control is a pliable
question of fact.
The decision in Mauricio wisely recognized the contours of
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human frailty and allowed the jury to factor in provocations
which might trigger a homicidal reaction. Given the severity of
the potential punishments, a jury should have discretion to review the spectrum of culpable offenses. This is consistent with
the legal principle that an individual's subjective state of mind is
dispositive of the level of criminal culpability. The court did not
give the defendant another means of exculpation, but simply provided greater latitude for the jury to consider lesser-included offenses along the state of mind continuum.
Richard Ballot

EVIDENCE-DRUNK

DRIVING-DISCOVERY IN DRIVING WHILE IN-

TOXICATED CASES Is

LIMITED TO RELEVANT ITEMS IN WHICH

THERE IS A REASONABLE BASIS TO BELIEVE WILL AID IN A DE-

FENDANT'S DEFENSE--State

v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 572

A.2d 640 (App. Div. 1990).
Police officers arrested and charged Earl Ford, William Derevlany, and Troy Martino (Defendants) with driving while intoxi-

cated (DWI). 240 N.J. Super. at 46, 572 A.2d at 641. Before
trial, the defendants moved to suppress the results of their
breathalyzer tests on the basis that the prosecutor in each case

failed to respond to legitimate discovery requests. Id. at 46-47,
572 A.2d at 641-42. All motions were denied. Id., 572 A.2d at
642. Subsequently, each defendant filed a motion for interlocutory appeal.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted re-

view of the three matters. Id. at 47, 572 A.2d at 642. In a written
opinion, the law division commanded the state to pay the defendants' attorney fees and costs associated with both the municipal

court actions and the law division appeals. Id. The law division
judge then remanded all three cases to municipal court for payment and required the state to comply with the defendants' discovery requests. Id. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate

Division, consolidated all three matters and granted leave to appeal. Id. The appellate court reversed, holding that discovery in

DWI cases is limited to relevant items in which there is a reason-
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able basis to believe will aid in a defendant's defense. Id. at 49,
572 A.2d at 643.
Judge Shebell, writing for the appellate panel, initially noted
that all three defendants requested roughly 100 distinct answers
or items as part of their eight-page discovery requests. Id. The
state, according to the judge, responded by delivering "the standard discovery packet from the New Jersey State Police." Id.
The court found that the packet for each defendant contained
eleven different items, including the DWI reports, the certificates
of analysis, and narratives of the investigations. Id. Appearing
before the municipal court, the defendants argued that the information contained in the "standard packet" was lacking. Id. The
state countered, claiming that the defendants' requests were unduly burdensome and overly broad. Id.
Judge Shebell began his legal analysis of the issue by stating
the well-established rule that discovery in DWI cases, pursuant to
N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3 (Rule 3:13-3), of all relevant materials is permitted. Id. at 48, 572 A.2d at 642. The judge noted that a DWI
defendant is entitled to discovery of the eleven pertinent items
enumerated in Rule 3:13-3(a) (citing State v. Utsch, 184 NJ.
Super. 575, 579, 446 A.2d 1236, 1238 (App. Div. 1982)). Judge
Shebell then distinguished discovery in a criminal case from that
in a civil case. Id., 572 A.2d at 642-43. In a criminal case, according to the judge, discovery of information that simply leads to
other relevant information is not permissible. Id., 572 A.2d at
643 (citing State v. Tull, 234 NJ. Super. 486, 499-500, 560 A.2d
1331, 1338 (Law Div. 1989)).
The appellate division framed the issue as whether the information sought in the case before it was relevant material within
the purview of Rule 3:13-3(a). Id. The court noted that the identical issue was presented in Tull. 240 NJ. Super. at 48, 572 A.2d
at 643. Judge Shebell rejected the holding in Tull as applicable in
this case, determining that the definition of relevance in Tull was
too broad a definition and impracticable in a DWI case. Id. at 49,
572 A.2d at 643. Thejudge observed that, although a defendant
is entitled to complete and full discovery, a defendant is not permitted, without a reasonable basis, to forage for evidence. Id.
The court next turned to the issue of how to precisely determine whether the defendant has a "reasonable basis" for requesting relevant information. Id. Judge Shebell determined
that information is relevant if it "(1) concerns an issue involved
in the prosecution, and (2) tends, reasonably, to prove a fact ma-

1990]

SURVEY

977

terial to such an issue." Id. (quoting State v. Tull, 234 N.J. Super.
at 499, 560 A.2d at 1331). The judge rejected the state's argument that "only those requests based upon a defendant's actual
knowledge of facts supporting defense contentions are relevant."
Id. Further, the court stressed that a defendant need not know
that defective procedures were actually used in administering a
breathalyzer test before requiring the state to disclose such information. Id.
Judge Shebell therefore held that discovery in drunk driving
cases is restricted to relevant items in which there is a reasonable
basis to believe will aid in a defendant's defense. Id. The court
qualified this basic premise by pointing out that Rule 3:13-3(d)
permits a court, for good cause, to limit discovery of otherwise
discoverable items. Id. at 50, 572 A.2d at 643. The scope of discovery, stressed the judge, is left to the discretion of the trial
court based upon the particular attendant facts of each case. Id.,
572 A.2d at 644.
Next, the appellate panel observed that relevancy determinations in DWI cases hinge on precedent surrounding the admissibility of breathalyzer tests. Id. The court noted that Romano v.
Kimmelman, 96 NJ. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984), established three
guidelines for determining when information in DWI cases is
relevant. 240 N.J. Super. at 50, 572 A.2d at 644. Breathalyzer
tests are admissible, according to Romano, when the instrument is
in correct working order, is given by a qualified operator, and is
employed in accordance with accepted procedures. Id. The
court then found that information, such as the machine operator's competence and the date of last repair, are highly relevant
items. Id. at 51, 572 A.2d at 644. However, Judge Shebell emphasized that discovery is limited to the categories listed in Rule
3:13-3(a) and that more particularized demands seeking to enlarge the scope of Rule 3:13-3 are not permissible in the absence
of extraordinary circumstances. Id.
Applying the defendants' discovery requests to the aforementioned principles, the court found that the information
sought exceeded the permissible scope of Rule 3:13-3. Id. The
panel pointed out that the state cannot be required to produce
the entire manual for operation of breathalyzer tests, nor the entire record of repair and servicing, without reasonable time constraints. Id. at 52, 572 A.2d at 644-45. Judge Shebell then
proffered a general guide stating that requests for full identification of the test used, including the model number, the date it was
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first put in service, and the results of the actual test administered,
are relevant permissible discovery items. Id., 572 A.2d at 645.
The court's decision serves to limit a defendant's right to
discovery in a DWI trial. Although the stigma attached to a DWI
conviction is great, the court properly refused to enlarge the
scope of discovery in such cases. While a defendant is entitled to
discovery of all relevant material enumerated in Rule 3:13-3, the
defendant should not be permitted to delay the proceedings by
scavenging for "all" material. The appellate division correctly
determined that a discovery request for a breathalyzer repair record exceeding a twelve-month period is unreasonable and irrelevant. Such information simply does not assist in a defendant's
defense. In light of the epidemic of drunk driving in our society,
the Ford court has appropriately closed the door to a procedural
loophole without substantively impinging a defendant's right to a
fair trial.
Deanna Lynne Mueller

